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Abstract Most tourism-scholars have taken an etic perspective on 
vulnerability, defining the concept as risk for - and largely confined to 
- vulnerable populations. An emic perspective, defining vulnerability 
as an experiential state inherent to the human condition, is anyhow 
largely absent. This study adopts a phenomenological stance and 
proposes to approach vulnerability in tourism from an emic 
perspective, transcending conceptualization equaling it with risk 
management. 
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1 Literature Review 
Generally, human vulnerability goes through a virtue of embodiment 
(e.g. illness, death), human nature as social and affective beings (e.g. 
emotions, rejection), human nature as socio-political beings (e.g. 
manipulation, oppression) and last, a relationship with the natural 
environment (dependency and influence) (Mackenzie et al., 2014). 
While contextual factors are relatively clear, whether to approach this 
phenomenon from an etic or emic perspective is still debated in 
academic circles.  
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The etic (externally evaluated risk; confined to vulnerable 
populations) approach takes an “objective” perspective, where the 
level of vulnerability is judged by external observers, such as 
healthcare practitioners or the general society (Spiers, 2000). Through 
a social and relational lens, the focus is frequently placed on the 
susceptibility of certain persons or groups to specific kinds of harm or 
threat by others (Mackenzie et al., 2014). Demi and Warren (1995) 
add that the etic perspective also heavily relies on demographics, 
meaning that certain individuals or groups are more susceptible to 
certain issues, such as concern and risk for health problems among the 
elderly. Consequently, people who are less able to function according 
to the values of a certain society are described and identified as 
vulnerable (Ferguson, 1978; Kipnis, 2001; Schroeder & Gefenas, 
2009). Following this approach, groups such as the homeless, mentally 
ill, poor, disabled, elderly people and refugees might not be able to up 
live to western society standards of independence and self-sufficiency, 
and socially sanctioned intervention is considered desired and 
necessary. This highlights a range of issues, including power 
inequality, dependency and exploitation (Mackenzie et al., 2014). 
Often this evaluation takes form of risk assessment, where 
vulnerability is equalled to “relative risk” and related to 
“endangerment”, “functional capacity”, “external recognition to the 
increased susceptibility to harm”, “observable and measurable 
behaviour”, and “universality” (Lessick, Woodring, Naber, & 
Halstead, 1992; Rose & Killien, 1983). The etic approach has also 
been adopted in natural sciences, where vulnerability often refers to 
“the probability that a given product may be misused, not meet its 
function effectively, become broken in use, may damage the 
environment; or that a service may occasionally become ineffective” 
(Cipolla, 2004, p. 109). In this case, vulnerability denotes product 
weakness, which is to be avoided or overcome, and leads to a 
somewhat exclusive dichotomy – being vulnerable or not. From an 
etic perspective, vulnerability can thus be considered the passing of a 
threshold of factors, beyond which harm is likely (Spiers, 2000). 
The emic perspective, on the other hand, defines vulnerability by lived 
experience, typically through concepts such as individual self-
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perception and discernment of challenges to the self and resources to 
withstand those (Spiers, 2000). Spiers (2000, p. 719) highlights that 
“the individual’s perceptions of self and challenges to the self, and of 
resources to withstand such challenges define (emic) vulnerability. 
These perceptions may have origins in socially determined values of 
performance and function, but those are always filtered through 
personal values and realities. Other scholars in ethics, bioethics and 
feminist philosophy, among others, have re-conceptualised 
vulnerability as an ontological feature of the human condition in order 
to dissociate the concept from negative connotations such as 
victimhood, helplessness, neediness and pathology. The new 
conceptualisation presents vulnerability as a universal, enduring and 
inevitable aspect of the human condition (Fineman, 2008; Mackenzie 
et al., 2014). Hence, vulnerability is defined through its universality, 
inevitability and enduring entanglement with human nature (Fineman, 
2008; Ricoeur, 2007; Turner, 2006). Two human conditions are 
usually linked to universal vulnerability: human embodiment, which 
exposes us to affliction and injury (MacIntyre, 1999; Nussbaum, 
2006), and the inherent sociality of human life, which makes us both 
vulnerable to and dependent on other people (Butler, 2009; Mackenzie 
et al., 2014). Vulnerability comes to light when a person’s sense of 
soundness in the various dimensions of his/her life gets disrupted by a 
challenge to which he/she is unable to respond. 
2 Method and empirical findings 
This study proposes a method embedded in the philosophical 
principles of descriptive phenomenology. Giorgi’s (2009) four steps of 
data analysis will be followed at the analysis stage. Step one is a 
detailed reading of the transcripts for the “sense of a whole”. At this 
stage, researchers carefully re-read through the obtained data to gain 
an overall understanding of the phenomenon at hand. This has been 
done separately by the researchers and outcomes have been discussed 
informally afterwards. Step two refers to a determination of relevant 
phenomenological meaning units, which was done following Giorgi’s 
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(2009) suggestions of marking places in transcripts where a shift in 
meaning occurs. This will be done separately on different transcripts, 
with several samples being “double-marked” by the researchers to 
check for coherence in the units identified. Step three transforms the 
identified meaning units into phenomenologically meaningful 
statements, changing them from a first-person to a third-person, 
intersubjective expressions. This will be done on separate meaning 
units by the researchers. Finally, step four identifies a general structure 
of the phenomenon based on the meaning units most commonly found 
across transcripts. Following Wassler and Schuckert (2017), this will 
also be based on the intuition of the researchers and not based on 
communality of the units only.  
3 Conclusions and Implications 
The study proposes an emic perspective to phenomenologically 
describe and interpret the essence of lived travel vulnerability. As 
such, this paper makes several contributions to existing theory. First, 
although this study will not be the first to problematize travel 
vulnerability, findings will show a more holistic and complex picture 
of the phenomenon. Subsequently, it is acknowledged that 
vulnerability is a concern not only for “risky” forms of travel, but that 
lived vulnerability permeates the travel experience as a fluctuating, but 
inherent part. The findings of this study will also extend the concept of 
travel vulnerability to diverse types of travel and tourism. This opens 
the door for a wide range of research investigating sources and states 
of lived vulnerability throughout diverse segments of travelers and 
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